货币制度回归金本位的可行性分析

　Thirdly, the gold standard will render tougher and tougher questions, bring about vicious circles if not handled properly, and finally cause a systemic recession all around the world. For one thing, a central bank can not regulate gross requirement via dominating gross money supply under the gold standard. As a result, when a country is suffering from a decline in its economy, the central bank could not help to stimulate the national demand or to spur the economical performance and the decline in economy will eventually lead to an overall stagnancy with the time-lapse. For another, because of the confinement to the amount of gold, all the countries around the world will endeavor to improve thEir production level to achieve a larger quota of the global gold. According to the Fisher Equation (P×Y=M×V), as the national output increases, the price for unite product and work force is getting lower and lower. This will cause a worldwide unemployment and then break the internal balance of an open economy, leading to a low efficiency of the global economical operation.
　　Last but not least, although the gold standard avoids the natural asymmetry that the reserve currency possesses, this kind of system also has the unique weak point. Because gold mines of different sizes scatter all around the world as rare mineral resources, the practice of the gold standard will endow the world's major gold producers, such as Russia and South Africa, as well as the biggest gold reservers, for instance America and Germany, higher economic influences than the rest of the countries. In this case, the major gold producers will have the privilege to choose whether they should slow down or even stop thEIr exploitation of gold as the gold price drops to a certain level. Their richness in the natural resources helps ensure them the chance to control the amount of the world currency. In the meantime, the major gold reservers can also obtain the economic cutokuan under gold standard on the basis of the gold holdings. However, this kind of authority has nothing to do with their economic outputs and the contribution to the outside world. By acting like this, the enthusiasm of the other countries for being engaged in their economic activities will be deeply hurt, thus giving birth to a new generation of worldwide economic hegemony.
　　[Conclusion]: As a matter of fact, other than the four main points just mentioned hereinbefore, there still lays a variety of barriers crying for being cleared if US dollar is determined to return to the gold standard. For example, in the last decades, America has issued a large number of national debts in order to make up for its huge government deficit. Then, what course should the other creditor nations follow if US dollar is no longer a world reserve currency? Besides, what the exactly actions should each government takes to reestablish the once lost faith among the people? All these reality-based problems and immense uncertainty make the return of the US dollar to the gold standard simply a wildest dream. Simultaneously, since Euro has suffered quite lot recently in dealing with the Greek crisis of external debts, while Chinese dollar, as one of the most promising new world reserve currencies, hasn't yet been ready to get convertible, US dollar still occupies an overwhelming status in today's international money market. So, in my point of view, we'd better preserve the monetary system we shared today, while trying to built up the authority and influence for the next potential world reserve currency, rather than dream of returning back to the doomed gold standard.
　　
　　Reference lists:
　　[1]《 International Economics Theory And Policy》Paul R.Krugman & Maurice Obstfeld Qinghua University Press 2008
　　[2]《货币银行学》戴国强 上海财经大学出版社 2006
　　[3]《大国金融方略：中国金融强国的战略和方向》 徐洪才 机械工业出版社
　　[4]"The Collapse of the Gold Standard"
　　http://www.chinavalue.net/Wiki/ShowContent.aspx?TitleID=408133
　　[5]"The Gold Standard Is Impossible To Return To Return China and Need Not Purchase IMF To Sell Gold"
　　http://www.leobbsx.net/news/financial/201004/13753.html