Is Chinese Military Modernization a Threat to the United Sta
U.S.Military Capabilities Compared with Those of China
The Bush administrations national securi-ty strategy attempts to ensure Americanpri-macy by outspending other nations on defense many times over ，thus dissuadingthem from competing with the United States.The United States is already more powerfulmilitarily relative to other nations of the world than the Roman，Napoleonic ，or British Empire was at its height.According to the national security strategy，Today ，the United States enjoys a position of unparalleled mili-tary strengthand great economic and political influence.8And the Bush administration would liketo keep such U.S.military domi-nance by profligate spending on military mightthat is deployed around the world.The history of international relations indicatesthat this strategy has little chance of succeed-ing.Historically，when threatenedby a coun-try that had become too powerful ，nations banded together to balanceagainst it.Of course ，administration officials claim that the United States isa benevolent power and that other nations will feel no need to balance against it.Such countries as Russia，India，and especially China might disagree.For example，China accuses the United States of maintain-ing a policy of containment，and Russiahas protested the expansion of the NATO alliance up to its borders.A good placefor more sus-tainable and less threatening U.S.policies to start is in East Asia.
Forces and Defense Spending.Currently ，the United States maintains about 100，000mili-tary personnel in East Asia.That military pres-ence is centered in Japan（41，000），South Korea（37，000），and afloat （19，000）。At sea ，theUnited States stations one carrier battle group and one Marine amphibious groupforward in the region and will now ensure that a second carrier group will be theremore of the time.The United States will also augment the num-ber of nuclear submarinesstationed in Guam.That military presence seems small compared to the military forcesof China，which has active forces of 2.3million.
Yet the U.S.military presence deployed forward in East Asia is only the tipof the ice-berg.That presence is a symbol of U.S.inter-est in the region andof the world-dominant U.S.military juggernaut that could be brought to bear againstthe large ，but largely antiquated ，Chinese military during any war between thetwo nations.
The United States spends about $400bil-lion a year on national defense andalone accounts for about 40percent of the worlds defense spending.There is somedispute about how much China spends because not all of its defense spending （forexample ，funds for weapons research and procure-ment of foreign weapons ）isreflected in the official Chinese defense budget.9David Shambaugh ，a prominentacademic authori-ty on the Chinese military，estimates total Chinese defense spendingat about $38bil-lion per year.10In the same ballpark，the International Instituteof Strategic Studies Military Balanceestimates such spending at $47billion peryear.11In contrast，the U.S.Department of Defenses estimate is pre-dictably muchhighernoting that annual Chinese military spending couldtotal $65billion.12BecauseShambaugh and the IISS do not build weapon systems to combat threats and thus haveno inherent conflict of interest，their independent estimates are probably lessprone to threat inflation than is DoDs estimate.
China has had real（inflation-adjusted）
increases in defense spending only since 1997.Chinese military expendituresare con-strained by limits on the ability of Chinas central government to collectrevenues and the concomitant budget deficit.13Moreover，increases in military spendinghave been sur-passed by rapid Chinese economic growth，leading to declines in defensespending as a proportion of gross domestic product.The $38billion to $47billionrange is roughly what other medium powers ，such as Japan，France ，and the UnitedKingdom ，spend on defense.But the militaries of those other nations are much smallerand more modern than the obsolete Chinese military，which needs to be completelytransformed from a guerrilla-style Maoist peoples army into a modern force thatemphasizes projec-tion of power on the sea and in the air.（Since the early 1990s，the Chinese have reoriented their military doctrine from fighting a peo-ples warunder modern conditions to fight-ing and winning a high-technology war againsta modern opponent.）14So the Chinese must spend much of their increases in officialdefense funding to prop up their sagging，oversized force and slowly convert itto a force that can project power ，to meet escalating payroll requirements tocompete with the thriving Chinese private sector，and to compensate the militaryfor off-the-books revenues lost when the Chinese polit-ical leadership orderedthe armed forces to stop running commercial businesses.
Consequently，Chinas spending to acquire weapons is equivalent only to thatof countries with total defense budgets of $10billion to $20billion.15Given thatthe United States ，with a gargantuan budget for the research，development，andprocurement of weaponswell over $100billion per year16is leaving its rich NATOallies behind in tech-nology （there is fear in NATO that U.S.capa-bilities areso far advanced that the U.S.armed forces would not be able to operate with alliedmilitaries），it most surely is leav-ing China in the dust.
The Chinese Defense Industry.The Chinese defense industry remains state owned，is grossly inefficient，and has had an abysmal track record of developing and producingtechnologically sophisticated weaponry.Thus，when press articles，hawkish analysts，or even the DoD notes Chinas pursuit of asymmetric technologies （ways that theweak can attack the vulnerabilities of the strong ）such as anti-satellite systems，infor-mation warfare ，and radio frequency weapons（nonnuclear devices that generateelectromagnetic pulses，much like those of a nuclear blast ，that neutralize enemyelectron-ics ）it does not mean that the Chinese efforts will be successful.Infact，most of the significant technological progress in the Chinese military hasresulted from weapons purchases from Russia.In other words ，the $1billion or$2billion a year China spends on Russian weapon systemswhich so alarms anti-Chinahawks in the United Statesis actually a sign of weakness in the Chinese defenseindustrial base.For example，Chinas purchase of Russian Kilo diesel sub-marinesprobably indicates that significant problems exist with Chinas homegrown Song-classsubmarine program.
Even when the Chinese buy advanced weapon systems abroad，they have difficultyintegrating them into their forces.For exam-ple ，the Chinese have had problemsintegrat-ing the Russian-designed Su-27fighter into their air force.17As in manyother militaries of the Third World ，deficiencies in Chinese training ，doctrine，and maintenance for sophisticated arms do not allow the full exploitation of suchsystems.
Military Equipment.Although the best crude measure of a nations military poweris probably its defense spending（because it includes money spent for the all-importantintangibles ，such as pay，training ，ammuni-tion ，maintenance of equipment），a nations military capital stockthe dollar value of its military hardwareisa measure of its forces modernity.The U.S.militarys capital stock is almost $1trillion.In contrast ，despite the purchase of some sophisticated Russian weapons，the capital stock of the largely obsolete Chinese military is only one-tenth ofthat totalwell under $100billion.In fact，China has fewer top-of-the-line weaponsthan middle powers，such as Japan and the United Kingdom ，and smaller powers ，such as Italy ，the Netherlands，and South Korea.18A further measure of a militarystrue capa-bility is based on how much is spent per sol-dier （for training，weapons，and the like）。
Even when calculated from the inflated DoD estimate of Chinese defense spending$65billion per yearChinas spending is less than $33，000per troop ，whereas the UnitedStates spends $213，208and Japan spends $192，649.19That disparity in value mirrorsa wide gap in capabilities.In contrast to the thoroughly modern U.S.military，Chinas armed forces have been able to modernize only slowly and in pockets.Accordingto DoD，the Chinese have a large air force3，400combat aircraft but only about100are modern fourth-gener-ation aircraft20（for example ，the Russian-designedSu-27and Su-30）。Most Chinese aircraft incorporate technology from the 1950sor 1960s.In contrast ，all of the more than 3，000aircraft in the U.S.air servicesare fourth-generation aircraft（F-14s ，F-15s，F-16s ，and F-18C/Ds ），andfifth-generation air-craft （F-22s and F-18E/Fs）are already begin-ning production.Even Chinese pilots who fly the limited number of fourth-generation fighters getonly 180flying hours of training per year（the pilots of older aircraft get muchless）；U.S.fighter pilots average 205flying hours per year.21
The Chinese army is still an oversized，outdated Maoist guerrilla army withinsuffi-cient airlift，logistics，engineering，and med-ical capabilities toproject power very far.In fact ，most of the Chinese army is good only for internalsecurity purposes.The forces equipment is antiquatedfor example，most tanks incorporatetechnology from the 1950s.Because of nepotism，party favoritism ，and poor paycompared to that in the boom-ing private sector，the army does not get the bestrecruits from Chinese society ，and morale of existing troops is bad.In contrast，the United States has the most potent and technologically sophisticated army inthe worldwith the best tank in the world（the M-1），the potent Apache anti-tankhelicopter，and future plans to add the Comanche reconnaissance helicopter.
According to DoD，the Chinese navy appears to have postponed indefinitely plansto buy an aircraft carrier.In addition ，DoD notes that the Chinese navys airdefense against enemy aircraft，precision-guided munitions ，and cruise missilesis limited by short-range weapons （only a few of Chinas ships have longer-rangesurface-to-air mis-siles ）and a lack of modern air surveillance systems and advanceddata links to commu-nicate that air picture to other ships in the fleet.22The purchaseof a few SOVREMEN-NYY-class destroyers from Russia will not alter that state ofaffairs significantly.In modern war，ships are vulnerable to attack from the air，and those limitations make the Chinese navy a sitting duck in any conflict.In contrast，the U.S.fleet has global dominance with 12large aircraft carriers （Russia isthe only other nation with a large aircraft carrier ，which is confined to portmost of the time），the best submarines in the world，and the most sophisticatedair defense capabilities afloat （Aegis destroyers and cruisers ）。
The Chinese are slowly modernizing their small strategic nuclear arsenal tomake it less vul-nerable to a preemptive attack from the worlds most potent nuclearforcethe U.S.strategic arsenal of thousands of warheads.But even with such modernization，Chinas nuclear arsenal will pale in comparison with the robust U.S.nuclear force.The Chinese currently have only about 20long-range missileshoused in fixed silosthatcan reach the United States.The missiles ，their liq-uid fuel，and their warheadsare stored separately ，making them very vulnerable to a preemptive strike beforethey could be assembled and launched.23During the Cold War，analysts saw as destabilizinga situation in which one side had vulnerable nuclear weapons.That nation mightuse the weapons in haste to avoid losing them during an opponents first strike.So，as long as the Chinese do not undertake a massive nuclear buildup to achieveparity with the United States （which they cannot afford and have shown no inclinationto do ），the modernization of Chinas nuclear weapons by the fielding of more invul-nerable road-mobile missiles could actually increase the nuclear stability betweenChina and the United States.China has not yet fielded a mis-sile with multiplewarheads，but it could in the futureespecially if the United States deployed missiledefenses that needed to be countered and the Chinese mastered the technology oflight-weight warheads similar to the U.S.W-88war-head.But because Chinese missileswith multiple warheads would be mobile，and thus survivable，they would be lesslikely to be a lucrative，destabi-lizing target than the Cold War situation ofmul-tiple warheads per fixed silo.
The Chinese have only one ballistic mis-sile submarine ，which usually remainsat the dock for repairs.Even at sea，to fire its mis-siles ，the submarine mustoperate fairly close to the United Stateswhere it would be more vulnerable to attack.In contrast ，the United States has 14ballistic missile submarines that are themost powerful weapon systems ever built and can launch their missiles at a targetfrom across the ocean.The Chinese have a successor ballistic missile submarinein development，but they have never had much luck perfecting the technology.Theonly time Chinas small nuclear arsenal could become a problem for the United Stateswould be in an emotional Chinese reaction to U.S.intervention in a crisis betweenChina and Taiwan.
A Massive Military Buildup？
David Shambaugh maintains that the Chinese are not engaged in a massive Soviet-stylemilitary buildup.24Even the Defense Intelligence Agency and high-ranking U.S.militaryofficials seem to agree with that assessment.According to the Defense IntelligenceAgency，by 2010，even the best 10percent of the Chinese military will have equipmentthat is more than 20years behind the capabilities of the U.S.military （equivalentto U.S.equipment in the late 1980s ）。The other 90percent of the Chinese militarywill have even more outdated equipment.25Gen.William J.Begert ，the commanderof U.S.Pacific Air Forces，asserted that Chinese military modern-ization wasa matter of concern but not alarm-ing.26His boss ，Adm.Dennis Blair，the com-mander of all U.S.forces in the Pacific，noted in 1999that China would not posea serious strate-gic threat to the United States for at least two decades.27OHanlonand Gill also conclude that the Chinese military lags behind U.S.forces by at least20years and that it will be that long before Chinas armed forces could significantlychal-lenge the United States and allied nations in East Asia.28Even DoD has admittedthat the PLA [Peoples Liberation Army]is still decades from possessing a comprehensivecapability to engage and defeat a modern adversary beyond Chinas boundaries.29
The assessments of DoD，Blair，and OHanlon and Gill are most likely predicatedon the excessively expansive conception of U.S.interests in East Asia that currentlyholds sway in U.S.foreign policy circles.If a more restrained view of U.S.interestsin the region were adopted，the slow Chinese mili-tary modernization would beeven less threatening to the United States.Chinese leaders have clearly learneda les-son from the implosion of the Soviet regime，which was largely caused bythe dysfunction-al socialist economy sagging under the weight of excessive militaryspending.Even the Pentagon admits that the Chinese leader-ship is focused primarilyon economic devel-opment and has given the modernization of Chinas military a prioritybelow develop-ment in industry ，agriculture，and science and technology.30DoDacknowledges that the Chinese military is modernizing selec-tively rather thanmassively ：
Rather than shifting priority resources from civil infrastructure and economicreform programs to an across-the-board modernization of the PLA ，Beijing is focusedon those programs and assets which will give China the most effective means forexploiting vulnerabilities in an adversarys military capabilities.31The Pentagonhas also conceded that the additional funding the Chinese leadership provided tothe military for modernization accelerated after the U.S.-led attack in Kosovo in1999.32Thus ，provocative U.S.actions lead to precisely the Chinese response thatthe United States would most like to avoid.Although in the last few years the Chinesehave been modernizing their military more rapidly than in the past，recent hikesin the U.S.budget for national defense have been extraordinary.The increase inthe U.S.bud-get for national defense in 2003alone is of approximately the samemagnitude as the entire Chinese defense budget（if the most probable estimates areaccepted）。And much of the increase in official Chinese defense spending is allocatedto maintaining a bloat-ed Chinese military until it can be trans-formed ，escalatingpayroll requirements to attempt to stay apace with the salaries in the booming Chineseprivate sector，and com-pensating the Chinese armed forces for off-the-booksrevenues lost when the Chinese leadership forced the divestiture of military holdingsin private businessesrather than to new weapons research，development，and production.The United States spends more than $40billion a year on research and devel-opmentfor weapons （again ，roughly equal to total annual Chinese defense spending ）and more than $60billion yearly on weapons pro-curement.33Thus，the speed ofU.S.military modernization dwarfs the pace of improve-ments in parts of the antiquatedChinese forces.In fact ，U.S.military modernization is outpacing even that ofwealthy NATO allies the next most capable militaries on the plan-et.In the warin Afghanistan，U.S.military commanders were reluctant to operate with alliedmilitaries because of the disparity in capabilities.
In conclusion ，even though the Chinese military is modernizing more rapidlythan in the past，the speed of the modernization is less than that of the modernizationof the already vastlysuperior U.S.force.In other words ，despite all of theclamor in the press and in the U.S.government about Chinese military modernization，the U.S.military is way ahead and the gap is actually widening （the same situationholds when U.S.armed forces are compared with all of the other mil-itaries inthe world ）。When pressed ，even anti-China hawks admit that Chinese militarycapabilities are far behind those of the United States.34
Of course ，the Chinese military is also often compared with the armed forcesof Taiwan because that is the most likely arena for an East Asian war.The usualimplication of such comparisons is that the capabilities of the Chinese militarymadepossible by Chinas larger and seemingly faster-growing economywill eventually outpacethose of Taiwan and threaten the islands security.That conclusion is overly simplistic.